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Abstract 
This paper studies the nexus between financial and non-financial foreign direct investment and 
its effect on manufacturing value added in Transition Economies, which are members of the 
EU. Three questions, which are pointed out in the theoretical literature, are discussed in the 
paper. We investigate whether financial services foreign direct investment has an effect on 
non-financial foreign direct investment; whether banks follow their clients; and whether there 
is any effect of foreign direct investment on economic growth. Those questions are tackled 
with empirical analysis using a dataset for 9 Transition Economies over the period 1996-2007. 
For most regressions we apply GMM and for one regression 2SLS, to tackle the endogeneity 
problem. The empirical results lead to three important statements: non-financial FDI is 
positively affected by financial services FDI and by market potential. Foreign banks in the EU 
Transition Economies are mainly driven by non-financial FDI and the capital intensity of a 
country. FDI crowds out domestic investment in the manufacturing sector. 
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment and foreign banks are considered as an important source of
economic growth and as a positive factor in the development and transformation of Tran-
sition Economies. The effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its short-run deter-
minants are quite well studied, both in theoretical and empirical sense. However, a few
studies about foreign financial services exist. Moreover, until now there has been only
little empirical work which deals with the causality issue and answers the often discussed
question:
Do foreign banks follow their clients or do foreign banks work as a catalyst for
foreign direct investment in Transition Economies?
The theoretical as well as the empirical literature is concerned about the effects
and determinants of the activity of foreign investors in Transition Economies. A posi-
tive growth effect of FDI trough backward knowledge spill-overs in Lithuanian firms was
found by Smarzynska Javorcik (2004). The general effect of FDI on the whole economy
is studied by Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998). They show that a sufficient high
level of absorption capacity is a crucial condition for an economy to gain from the pres-
ence of FDI. The determinants of FDI in a gravity model approach are studied by Bevan
and Estrin (2004) and Carstensen and Toubal (2004). Both find that market potential and
risk have a strong effect on FDI. However, neither one of these two studies considers
the role of foreign banks, which is a very important economic factor. A study by Mérö
and Valentinyi (2003) on the five largest EU Transition Economies shows the effect of
foreign banks on the economy. Foreign banks contributed to privatization and modern-
ization of the banking sector and lead to stability. Another study on this topic, by Weill
(2003) shows that foreign banks increase competition and lead to more efficiency in the
banking sector. This leads to the question why foreign banks decide to enter Developing
Economies. In comparison to the literature on FDI, relatively few studies exist on this
topic. Goldberg and Johnson (1990) find that US banks follow their clients abroad. Con-
trary, Wezel (2004) does not find evidence for this hypothesis for the countries of interest.
German banks indeed follow their clients when countries in Asia are considered. How-
ever, in Central and Eastern Europe the economic development is the main determinant.
Further on, the recent empirical literature shows that foreign banks increase the efficiency
of the local economy. Eller, Haiss and Steiner (2006) use foreign banks as an impor-
tant determinant of total factor productivity growth. Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and
∗We thank Mario Padula for advice on econometrics and very useful ideas. Participants of the research
seminar at the National Bank of Poland, at Warsaw University, at the Warsaw School of Economics, the
WISE seminar at the University of Venice, the International Risk Managment Conference in Venice 2009
and the Warsaw International Economic Meeting 2009 provided useful comments.
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Sayek (2004) find that the development of the local financial system crucially affects the
positive effect of FDI on growth.
Data on FDI and foreign banks seems to show a pattern in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Countries (CEEC): Countries which have undergone a reform and allowed foreign
banks to operate quite early, present also the highest FDI to GDP ratio in the past years.
For example, by 2004 most of Hungarian banks are fully or partially owned by multi-
nationals (Akbar and McBride 2004). As reported by Buch (1997) the market share of
foreign or joint-venture banks in total assets in 1995 was 22.7% in Hungary, 15.9% in
Czech Republic and 4.4% in Poland. Mérö and Valentinyi (2003) report data about for-
eign bank assets as % of GDP. In the year 1998 and 2002 in Hungary the shares are 35.4%
and 49%, 31.8% and 94.4% for the Czech Republic and 9.6% and 40.7% for Poland. In
the same years the share of foreign banks in commercial bank assets was 62.5% and
90.7% for Hungary, 28.1% and 85.8% for the Czech Republic and 17.4% and 70.9% for
Poland. The presence of foreign banks seems to be related to the FDI to GDP ratio in
those countries. In 1995 Hungary received a considerable FDI inflow of 10% of GDP,
which stayed at around 7% in the subsequent years (The World Bank 2008). The Czech
Republic received 4% and only 2% in the following years. A peak of 10% appeared in
1999 and the inflow remained quite high. Finally, Poland received around 2.6% and this
number stayed constant, until it increased to 4.3% in 1999 and stayed at this level. The
average FDI inflow over the period 1995-2005 was 6.57% in Hungary, 5.94% in the Czech
republic and 3.42% in Poland.
Those numbers do not allow for conclusions, however they indicate that an early
opening to foreign banks and significant participation of those was followed by a signifi-
cant inflow of FDI. It is possible that economic factors have triggered both kinds of FDI
with different lags. A precise empirical study is necessary to find the exact relationship
and causality. Basing on the recent literature, we formalize the following questions, which
we answer by empirical evidence: Do foreign banks work as a catalyst for FDI? Do for-
eign banks follow their client or open new markets? What is the effect of FDI and foreign
banks on GDP growth? Three different but strictly connected problems are tackled in
this paper. The literature review on each of the topics is presented in the corresponding
section.
The data used in this paper is as follows. The CEEC destination countries are Bul-
garia (1999-2007), Czech Republic (1997-2006), Estonia (1997-2007), Hungary (1998-
2006), Latvia (1996-2007), Lithuania (1995-2007), Poland (1996-2006), Slovak Republic
(1996-2005) and Slovenia (1994-2006). Data availability allows to study the period pre-
sented in brackets. Romania is excluded due to data availability problems. Data on bilat-
eral FDI stocks and stocks disaggregated by sectors origins from the Vienna Institute for
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International Studies. The data on financial services foreign direct investment (FSFDI) is
reported at the NACE level. Financial services include banking, insurance, pension funds
and leasing. The fraction of banking in the FSFDI stock is at least 80% in the case of
Poland and up to 95% in the case of Estonia (Eurostat 2009). Foreign banks and other
financial institutions which are usually subsidiaries1 of the same investor offer also the re-
maining financial services. Thus, foreign financial services can be called foreign banking
activity. However, to be precise, we use the term financial services foreign direct invest-
ment (FSFDI) through this paper. Other data that is used in this paper origins mainly
from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2008), the Eurostat (2009) and
OECD (2009). We compare data from different sources and use data which is consistent
among different sources2. All variables are transformed into international $ at year 2000
constant prices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the determinants of foreign
direct investment from donor countries to host countries. Section 3 deals with the determi-
nants of foreign financial services. The nexus between foreign direct investment, foreign
financial services and domestic investment in the manufacturing sector is presented in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Determinants of bilateral FDI stocks
A large and continuously growing stock of foreign direct investment can be observed in
Transition Economies. Around 70-85% of FDI in both the financial and non-financial
sector origins from the following OECD countries: Austria, Belgium (and Luxembourg),
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK and
US. In order to visualize the magnitude and the dynamics of the FDI stock in Transition
Economies, we present data for Poland and for Slovenia. Poland is by far the largest econ-
omy in the group of Transition Economies studied in this paper. The highest inward FDI
stock origins from Germany, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium and Luxembourg.
Graph 2.1 shows the development of bilateral FDI stocks and the aggregate FSFDI stock
in Poland.
1For example, in Poland the bank Kredyt Bank and the insurance company Warta are owned by the KBC
group; Allianz and ING offer banking and insurance; Moreover, PeKaO, the largest bank, offers banking
and leasing. It is owned by UniCredit Banca.
2We observe some discrepancies in the data on the same variables from different sources. The reason
might be different vintages of original data or different definitions of some variables.
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Figure 2.1: Stock of FDI from 13 donor countries and total FSFDI stock in Poland.
It is interesting to see the development in Slovenia, which has adopted a market
economy very early and is now a member of the European Monetary Union. It also pro-
vides the longest time series of data. The development of the FDI and FSFDI stock in
Slovenia is presented in graph 2.2. Austria is the main donor country of FDI, followed
by France, Germany and the Netherlands. In both countries the FDI and FSFDI stock
increases very much over time. For the other host countries, qualitatively a similar picture
can be observed. FDI has a very high share in gross capital formation and a significant
share of workers is employed by multinational companies (MNCs). However, only few
advanced empirical studies on the long-run determinants of bilateral FDI stocks in Tran-
sition Economies exist. The determinants of the FDI stock in EU Transition Economies
are studied at the bilateral level by Bevan and Estrin (2004). Their study is repeated by
Carstensen and Toubal (2004) who take the endogenity problem into account. Carstensen
and Toubal (2004) perform a dynamic panel difference GMM regression on bilateral FDI
stocks in 7 Central and Eastern European Countries supplied by 10 OECD countries3
over the period 1993-1999. They find that the main determinants of FDI in Transition
Economies are lagged FDI, market potential, skill ratio, private market share, the meth-
ods of privatization and relative capital endowments. Trade costs, relative unit labor costs
and risk have a strong negative effect.
3In their study, the OECD countries are Austria, Belgium (including Luxembourg), Denmark, France,
Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain, UK and US. The CEEC destination countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
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Figure 2.2: Stock of FDI from 11 donor countries and total FSFDI stock in Slovenia. Portugal
and South Korea do not report a stock.
The application of a dynamic panel and usage of stocks in levels allows to see the long-run
relationships and impacts of the variables of interest. We apply a modified version of the
equation proposed by Carstensen and Toubal (2004). We include 9 Transition Economies
and 13 donor countries, moreover extend the period to 1996-2007. This allows us to
make more general statements about the long-run dynamics of the stocks. Moreover, we
include financial services FDI. Relative unit labor costs are rising in Transition Economies
and thus a well-functioning and competetive capital market is of high importance to FDI
inflow, as Akbar and McBride (2004) state. We consider this fact in our study. FDI
denotes the stock of foreign direct investment excluding financial services. FSFDI is the
stock of foreign direct investment in the financial services sector. The index i denotes the
host country, j denotes the donor country and t is the time index. The bilateral FDI stock
is described by the following equation:
FDIi jt = αFDIi jt−1+β1FSFDIi jt +β2MKPit +β3RGDPi jt
+β4RKLi jt +β5INT SPREADit +β6RISKit +µi j + vi jt
(2.1)
The lagged dependent variable FDIi jt−1 enters the regression with the parameter α (|α|<
1), which gives its persistence. MKP stands for market potential of the host country. It is
the sum of its GDP and the GDPs of the other Transition Economies, which are divided
by the road distance between the capitals. Most of FDI is assumed to be of horizontal
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nature (Neuhaus 2006), but a fraction is used to serve the surrounding market. GDP and
market potential cannot be included in the same regression. Even if market potential is
measured excluding the GDP of the host country these variables are collinear. Therefore,
GDP is included in MKP and not estimated separately. Also GDP per capita and GDP
per worker are colinear to MKP thus are not included in the regressions. RKL measures
relative capital intensity per worker, which is proxied by the investment to worker ratio.
Different variables which capture the development and stability of the financial market
and the economy are included. The interest rate spread (INT SPREAD) measures the risk
of doing business and proxies the efficiency of banks. The less efficient banks are, the
higher their margin is. Moreover, the spread includes the risk premium. M2RES is the
ratio of M2 money to reserves and it is a good indicator for crisis risk. All $ variables
are divided by the number of workers. We apply logarithm to market potential, in order
to capture its growth. We take first differences in order to make the data stationary and
get rid of unobservable country specific effects. The equation is estimated with difference
GMM and has the form:
∆FDIi jt = α∆FDIi jt−1+β1∆FSFDIit +β2∆ lnMKPit +β3∆RGDPi jt
+β4∆RKLi jt +β5∆INT SPREADit +β6∆RISKit +∆vi jt
(2.2)
Data4 on bilateral FDI stocks is avaliable on total economy level. Stocks of financial ser-
vices are reported only as total stocks in the host country and their origin is not specified.
We have to simplify the regression and use FSFDIit instead of FSFDIi jt . The only change
is the fact that we cannot determine the direct relationship between FSFDI and FDI from
a specific donor country, but rather estimate how firms from different countries react to
total FSFDI stock.
2.1 Empirical results on the determinants of bilateral FDI stocks
We apply a gravity model and run a Generalized Method of Moments regression to tackle
the endogeneity problem. This econometric method is very often used in the recent lit-
erature. The GMM regression corrects the endogeneity bias and allows to determine
causality between FDI and FSFDI. We present a very short description of the GMM
method5. The simplest specification of the Dynamic Panel is yi jt = αyi jt−1 +βxi jt + εi jt
with |α| < 1 and εi jt = µi j + vi jt . The total error term εi jt is composed of an unobserved
4There is a huge interest in dissagregated bilateral data, as stated by the International Monetary Fund
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cdis/index.htm), however data will be avaliable in the year 2010 or even
2011. Once data is collected, the regression should be repeated with dissagregated financial service data.
5Roodman (2006), who is the author of the GMM implementation in Stata (xtabond2) which we apply,
gives a theoretical and practical introduction to GMM. Another good introduction to applied GMM and
other advanced dynamic panel data models is Baum (2006).
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country-pair effect µi j and the error term vi jt . Following Arellano and Bond (1991) we
take first differences, thus the unobserved effect and the time trend disappears. When
the explanatory variables are predetermined, we obtain the following moment conditions
E[xi jt−1∆vi js] = 0 for t ≤ s and E[yi jt−2∆vi js] = 0 for t ≤ s. Running the gravity regres-
sion, we first replicate the specification used by Carstensen and Toubal (2004). We get
very similar results, which are not reported. Only the coefficient α on the lagged de-
pendent variable FDIi jt−1 is around twice as large. This indicates that the FDI stock is
more persistent in the recent periods than it was in the periods studied by Carstensen and
Toubal (2004). Its present value depends to a large extent on its past value. The parame-
ter α, which takes values around 0.7 in the regressions, is used to calculate the long-run
effects. The short-run effects of the explanatory variables are presented in table 2.1. The
long-run multiplier is calculated as 1/(1−α) and takes a value around 3.3. This means
that in the long run a change of an explanatory variable has the impact reported in the
table, multiplied by around 3.3.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
FDI_lag 0.6951 0.7125 0.6960 0.7167 0.7275 0.7107
(18.09) (18.93) (18.97) (18.48) (19.79) (17.76)
FSFDI 0.1337 0.1342 0.1060 0.1270 0.1294 0.1019
(3.18) (3.21) (3.08) (3.15) (3.31) (3.01)
MKP 2100.543 2370.877 1471.408 3314.45 3462.643 2621.731
(2.70) (2.89) (2.14) (3.49) (3.58) (3.15)
RKL -47.21176 -115.0385 -22.9976 -197.1445 -228.6418 -107.4878
(-0.31) (-0.91) (-0.18) (-1.17) (-1.68) (-0.78)
RGDP 913.6149 660.6271 618.3289
(2.19) (1.70) (1.66)
M2RES -74.6924 -78.7157 -73.4994 -70.3425
(-2.54) (-3.03) (-2.98) (-3.13)
INTSPREAD -13.8853 -19.0520
(-1.16) (-1.62)
N. Obs 822 822 794 822 822 794
N. Groups 102 102 102 102 102 102
Hansen test 88.48 98.36 100.71 97.66 100.50 100.56
p-value 0.012 0.060 0.299 0.114 0.439 0.829
AR(1) p-value 0.027 0.026 0.019 0.027 0.026 0.019
AR(2) p-value 0.082 0.082 0.131 0.084 0.083 0.128
N. Instruments 66 84 101 88 106 123
LR Multiplier 3.28 3.48 3.28 3.53 3.67 3.45
Table 2.1: Short-run determinants of FDI. GMM regression. (z-statistic) in brackets, bold =
significant at 5% level. Time trend included.
FSFDI enters all specifications in a positive and highly significant way. The coeffi-
cient is estimated to be around 0.10 to 0.13. FSFDI is the total stock in a given country
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and is usually bigger than the bilateral FDI stock (see graph 2.1 and 2.2). Thus, the pa-
rameter appears small, while the effect is large. It shows that foreign financial services
work as an important catalyst for non-financial FDI. Market potential growth enters all
regressions in a highly significant way. This confirms that FDI is mostly of horizontal
nature and also used to serve the surrounding countries’ markets. Relative capital endow-
ments do not have any effect, once we control for FSFDI. In a regression without FSFDI,
which is not reported, RKL has a positive and significant impact. This goes in favor of
the gravity model. The bigger the capital intensity discrepancy is, the more can a multi-
national company gain from its comparative advantage. However, once we control for the
stability and efficiency of the financial market (which is strongly related to FSFDI) the
differences play no more a significant role. In specification (2) we add the M2 money
over reserves ratio which measures the risk of a crisis. The higher this ratio, the more risk
the multinational company has to face. It has a strong negative effect on the FDI stock. In
specification (3) we include the interest spread. As expected this variable has a negative
sign, but it is insignificant. The spread measures the inefficiency of the banks and also
the risk of doing business. Because MNCs can obtain financing through FSFDI, it does
not play a significant role. In specification (4) we include the relative size of the donor
country GDP to the host country GDP (RGDP). It has a significant and positive effect.
The larger the donor economy is in relative terms, the more FDI it can supply to the host
country. Different combinations of the explanatory variables are presented in specifica-
tions (5) and (6). The parameters do not change in a significant way, which means that
the model is robust. We also include other risk measures and parameters like government
consumption, corporate tax rate, exports and imports but they are insignificant. Those re-
sults are not reported. Education of workers and share of telephone line subscribes which
is a proxy for technology level were included. Again they are insignificant. Moreover,
unit labor costs and relative unit labor costs do not have a significant impact. Most likely
because they are rather stable and similar to those of the donor country.
The long-run determinants are calculated by multiplying the coefficient β by the
long-run multiplier 1/(1−α). For example, the long-run effect of FSFDI in specification
(1) is 1/(1−α) ∗β1=1/(1-0.7)*0.1337=0.4387. We apply the delta method to calculate
the standard errors of the nonlinear combination of two coefficients6. The significance of
the variables does not change in a noticeable way. It is straightforward to interpret the
long-run effect of FSFDI, MKPD, RKL and RGDP. FSFDI and market potential grow
over time. An one time increase leads to a permanent positive effect. Relative capital
endowments and GDP levels converge, thus their impact will diminish in the long run.
However, the interest spread rate and the M2 money to reserves ratio do not show a clear
6This is done with the Stata command nlcom.
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pattern. One period’s impact might be absorbed by a movement in the opposite direction
in the next period.
The GMM specification is restricted to include up to 2 lags in order to keep the
number of instruments lower than the number of groups. For all regressions we also ap-
ply a GMM specification in which the starting lag for the instrument is 2 and the longest
lag is 4. Another specification uses lags from 1 to 3. In all cases only the number of in-
struments increases drastically. The estimation results do not change in a systematic way,
which confirms the robustness of the model. These results are not presented. All GMM
regressions are well specified, which is indicated by the Hansen test of over-identification
and the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation. We always include
the time trend, as recommended by Roodman (2006). There is a highly significant nega-
tive time trend which is around -100. Most of the stock variables have a time trend. FDI
and FSFDI are stationary, once the time trend is accounted for. The time trend is only
negative when market potential is included. This means that it leads to a too high FDI
level and the time trend corrects it downwards.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
FSFDI 0.4387 0.4671 0.3489 0.4487 0.4749 0.3524
(4.39) (4.34) (4.4) (4.38) (4.57) (4.50)
MKPD 6891.452 8246.777 4841.233 11701.840 12707.880 9063.555
(2.53) (2.66) (1.91) (3.01) (3.20) (2.48)
RKL -154.892 -400.145 -75.666 -696.029 -839.114 -371.594
(-0.31) (-0.92) (-0.18) (-1.18) (-1.72) (-0.79)
RGDP 3225.566 2424.497 2137.617
(2.10) (1.69) (1.53)
M2RES -259.8075 -258.9909 -269.7426 -243.1802
(-2.56) (-3.12) (-3.01) (-3.12)
INTSPREAD -45.6855 -65.8645
(-1.15) (-1.55)
Table 2.2: Long-run determinants of FDI obtained from the GMM regression. (z-statistic) in
brackets, bold = significant at 5% level.
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrices of the variables in levels and in
first differences for all regressions in this paper are presented in appendix A.3 and A.4.
The baseline regression specifications in Stata are presented in appendix A.2.
The empirical results allow to conclude that foreign financial services are of highest
importance to the bilateral FDI stock. Moreover, the FDI stock is persistent and depends
to a large extent on its past period value. The market potential is very important, which
indicates that FDI is mainly of horizontal nature and also used to serve the surround-
ing market. MNCs are exposed to the risk of an economic crisis and prefer to invest in
countries which are less prone to it.
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3 Determinants of foreign financial services
This section presents possible economic determinants of FSFDI in transition economies.
The empirical analysis shows to which extent banks follow their clients and whether they
aim to serve the host market. An increasing stock of FSFDI can be observed over the last
decade, on average. The following graph shows the stock of non-financial FDI and FSFDI
in the four largest Transition Economies. The FDI stock is around five to ten times as large
as the FSFDI stock. The correlation between the two stocks is presented in the appendix.
It is crucial to know what determines the very large and highly important activity of
foreign financial services. Among many studies on the benefits of opening up for foreign
banks are Buch (1997), Mérö and Valentinyi (2003) and Akbar and McBride (2004).
However, there are only a few recent empirical studies on the determinants of foreign
banking activity in Central and Eastern European Transition Economies. Concerning
banking activity in Developed and Developing Economies many empirical studies can be
found. Buch (2000) as well as Jeanneau and Micu (2002) give a good overview of the
literature and compare the methods used. A large share of papers deals with the assets of
US, Japanese and German banks abroad. We present the results of two papers in more
detail. Both deal with the question whether banks follow their clients abroad and come to
different conclusions.
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Figure 3.1: Stock of FDI and FSFDI in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak
Republic.
Goldberg and Johnson (1990) study the assets of foreign branches of US banks in 22
10
countries over the period 1972-1985. Total assets are related to regulation, foreign direct
investment, exports relative to GDP, population, GDP per capita, domestic deposits and
exchange rate change. The authors state that the literature as well as some previous em-
pirical results connect foreign bank activity with the follow-the-client hypothesis. Conse-
quently, also trade is linked to foreign bank assets. The level of development is proxied by
GDP per capita, while market potential is proxied by the population size. Domestic assets
represent the activity of domestic banks, which have a negative effect on foreign banks.
Foreign branches focus on wholesale banking and the study by Goldberg and Johnson
deals with this kind of banking. Their empirical result seems to confirm that banks follow
their clients. FDI has a positive and highly significant impact. Also trade and regulation
affects foreign bank assets positively. Domestic assets and the level of development have
a negative effect. Finally, potential market size and exchange rate fluctuations do not enter
in a significant way. We conclude from their study that US banks were attracted by US
firms operating abroad and by less developed economies in the 70’s and 80’s. In contrast
to banks considered in their study, most of foreign banks in EU Transition Economies
have a considerable share in retail banking. Wezel (2004) studies the determinants of the
presence of German banks abroad. While for Asia he finds a very strong follow-the-client
effect, for CEECs this effect is absent. Banks are strongly attracted by GDP per capita.
Crisis risk, measured as M2 money over domestic reserves, has a strong negative effect.
In order to find the determinants of foreign banks in Transition Economies, we base
on the specification proposed by Goldberg and Johnson (1990) and Wezel (2004), modify
it and regress the following equation:
∆FSFDIit = α∆FSFDIit−1+β1∆FDIit +β2∆INVit +β3∆FREEDOMit
+β4∆TAXit +β5∆INFLAT IONit +β6∆M2RESit +∆vit
(3.1)
We include the lagged dependent variable to obtain the long-run determinants. FSFDI
depends on the non-financial FDI stock and total investment in a given year. This allows
to state whether banks follow their clients or are directly involved in the host market.
While many studies include GDP, we include investment. The results do not change very
much, as investment takes a rather constant share of GDP. Banks are directly connected to
investment. In the later part of this paper we focus on investment, therefore we use it here
as a determinant of FSFDI. There is a strong collinearity between investment and GDP,
thus only one measure of economic development can be used. The index of economic
freedom FREEDOM is included. This variable origins from the Heritage Foundation
(2009) and measures how easily individuals can operate on the market. A free economy
allows individuals to take most efficient decisions and allocate their effort in actions they
consider as profitable. This increases the number of businesses and thus more potential
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clients for the foreign financial services exist. Dissagregated indicators of economic free-
dom cannot be applied for the considered countries. The freedom of banking, business
and investment is nearly constant, thus by taking first differences these variables drop
out. Further on, we include the corporate tax rate TAX . High taxes make a host coun-
try less attractive to foreign investors. Inflation which measures macroeconomic risk and
M2 money over reserves, which measures the risk of a crisis are included. Moreover,
we include the real interest rate REALINT and the development of the financial market
FMKT . Financial market development is measured as the sum of stock market capital-
ization plus credits to the private sector divided by the GDP. Both variables can have a
positive effect on the profitability of foreign financial services. To tackle the endogeneity
between FSFDI, FDI and investment, we apply a 2SLS regression, using the XTIVREG2
code written by Schaffer (2007). We include FDI and investment lagged by one period
as instruments. Moreover, lagged GDP, unit labor costs and share of exports to GDP
are used as instruments. Lagging GDP solves the problem of strong correlation between
GDP and investment in the same period. The stock of FSFDI follows a time trend and
moreover, unobserved country effects can play a role. We therefore use the First Differ-
ence regression to solve this problem. The error terms are robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. We expect the FDI variable to enter significantly. Investment, tax
and country risk should play an important role, too. Contrary to the results obtained by
Goldberg and Johnson (1990), we expect that economic development, measured by in-
vestment, has a strong positive effect. Investment should enter positively, as it requires
different financial services and thus increases the need for an advanced financial market.
Foreign banks have a comparative advantage and can compete with domestic banks very
well. In fact, foreign banks control former state banks and compete in the retail banking
market. Moreover, the activities of foreign and domestic banks seem to converge as Weill
(2003) states. This means that foreign banks serve to a large extent host country clients.
On the other hand, domestic banks have to improve their business practices due to the
increased competition.
3.1 Empirics on the determinants of foreign financial services
The regressions, presented in table 3.1, show that the FSFDI stock does not depend on
its past period value. This result is in line with the fact that FDI in financial services
can move very quickly and is mainly determined by market parameters. Financial capital
is very mobile compared to any other fixed capital. Moreover, as expected, FDI and
investment positively affect the size of the FSFDI stock. In all specifications the stock
of non-financial FDI has a very strong positive effect. The Stock-Yogo test for weak
identification indicates that in all specifications the maximal IV relative bias is 5%. Thus,
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all regressions and the choice of instruments can be considered as well specified.
FDI enters with very high significance, which means that foreign financial services
follow their clients, or more general, they follow western clients to Transition Economies.
Throughout all specifications investment has a significant effect on FSFDI. This means
that foreign banks are not only following their clients but to a large extent also serve the
host country market. Surprisingly, the index of economic freedom has no effect. This
might result from the fact that it changes only little over time. The change of the tax rate
does not have any effect, too. The tax rate declines in general, but is constant over many
periods. In specification (2) we include two measures of macroeconomic risk, namely
inflation and crisis risk, measured by the ratio of M2 money to reserves. Inflation enters
with high significance, while crisis risk has no effect. The negative effect of inflation
indicates that banks are afraid of loosing their loans due to a too high inflation. Crisis
risk has no significant effect, because unlike FDI, FSFDI is very mobile and in case of an
incoming crisis banks can shift capital from one market to another.
FSFID FSFID FSFID FSFID
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FSFDI_lag 0.2324 0.1982 0.2139 0.2413
(0.90) (0.87) (0.89) (0.90)
FDI 0.1313 0.1362 0.1379 0.1304
(3.71) (3.95) (3.97) (3.61)
INV 0.2052 0.1833 0.1863 0.2035
(3.37) (2.97) (3.21) (3.32)
FREEDOM -13.7642 -22.4501 -15.4058 -11.7058
( -0.63) (-1.04) ( -0.73) (-0.53)
TAX -9.4361 -19.0510 -15.7533 -11.6959
(-0.43) (-0.82) (-0.71) ( -0.53)
INFLATION -30.7126
(-2.06)
M2RES 151.0707
(1.16)
REALINT 21.2013
(1.56)
FMKT 5.3370
( 1.00)
Nr. Obs 76 76 76 76
R2 0.58 0.63 0.61 0.59
Weak ID test 19.32 18.11 21.46 18.65
Stock-Yogo critical values
5% max IV relative bias 13.97 13.97 13.97 13.97
10% max IV size 19.45 19.45 19.45 19.45
15% max IV size 11.22 11.22 11.22 11.22
Table 3.1: Short-run determinants of FSFDI. 2SLS First Differences regression (XTIVREG2) with
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F weak
identification test statistic and Stock-Yogo critical values for 5% maximal IV bias and 10% and
15% relative size bias reported. (z-statistic) in brackets, bold = significant at 5% level.
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In specification (3) the real interest rate is added to the base specification. The real interest
rate directly affects the profit of banks. However, this variable just fails to be significant
at the 10% level. The real interest rate differs significantly in levels among countries.
Some, like Estonia and Latvia show negative real interest rates. However for most of the
observations the interest rate is relatively stable. Finally, specification (4) captures the
development of the financial market. This variable is the stock market capitalization plus
credit to private sector divided by GDP. It does not enter in a significant way. This shows
that the financial development is not a determinant of FSFDI. Following the literature, it
seems that the development of the financial market is a result of the presence of foreign
financial services and does not affect those.
The estimation results show that FSFDI does not depend on its past value, is mainly
affected by FDI and domestic investment. Financial services seem to follow to a large
extent foreign clients. Data does not allow to state whether FSFDI is following FDI from
the same country or whether FDI is attractive to foreign financial services, in general.
Domestic investment positively and significantly affects the FSFDI stock, which indicates
that the host market is of importance. This is consistent with the findings of Wezel (2004).
Crisis risk does not have any significant effect. The mobility of FSFDI makes it less prone
to some risks, which hinder FDI.
4 The nexus between FSFDI, FDI and domestic invest-
ment in manufacturing
The manufacturing sector attracts a large share of FDI and is important to the whole econ-
omy. On average 30% of the FDI stock can be found in the manufacturing sector (Vienna
Institute for International Studies 2008a). Products from the manufacturing sector are
used in the services sector or the trade sector. Tools of any kind produced by manufac-
turing firms serve in the construction sector. Moreover, the output of the manufacturing
sector can be easily stored and exported or imported. Because of its importance, we focus
in this section on the different industries of the manufacturing sector. Investigating the
nexus of FDI, FSFDI and value added growth, we focus on the DA-DN NACE classifi-
cation manufacturing industries7. This is the deepest disaggregation level for which all
necessary data for all countries is available. The considered countries and time-periods
7The classification is: DA: food products, beverages & tobacco; DB: textiles and textile products; DC:
leather and leather products; DD: wood and wood products; DE: pulp, paper, pap. products, publishing
& printing; DF: cole, refined petrol. products & nuclear fuel; DG: chemicals, chemical products & man-
made fibers; DH: rubber and plastic products; DI other non-metallic mineral products; DJ: basic metals &
fabricated metal products, DK: machinery and equipment n.e.c.; DL: electrical and optical equipment; DM:
transport; DN: manufacturing n.e.c.
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are as follows: Czech Republic (1996-2006), Estonia (2000-2007), Hungary (1998-2006),
Lithuania (1995-2007), Poland (1995-2006), Slovak Republic (1995-2006) and Slovenia
(1995-2007). For all countries but Estonia and Poland all industries are considered. For
Estonia data is available only for industries DD, DF, DG, DH, DI, DJ and DK, while
for Poland all industries but DC, DE and DN are present. We completely exclude Bul-
garia and Latvia, because data on crucial variables like investment and FDI in industries
is available for a very short period only. For all regressions we apply two-step differ-
ence GMM in order to tackle the endogeneity problem. The error terms are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
The impact of financial services and indicators of development of the financial mar-
ket can have different effects on each industry. A better developed financial market serves
all industries, in general. However, the more an industry depends on external finance,
the higher this positive effect will be. To capture this, the FSFDI are interacted with the
dependence on external financing (DEF) of each industry8. "External dependence is the
fraction of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from operations", as defined
by Rajan and Zingales (1998)[p. 567]. Rajan and Zingales (1998) compute the depen-
dence of different sectors on external financing for the US and argue that this pattern
holds for any country in the world. Their variables are used by Guiso, Jappelli, Padula
and Pagano (2004) to test the impact of financial development on growth in the EU. We
interact the dependence variable with FSFDI and other financial variables in order to de-
termine their effect on growth and investment in different sectors. The least dependent
sector is DC, leather and leather products with an value equal to -0.14. The highest de-
pendence, 0.77, is found in the electrical and optical equipment sector DL. Those values
mean that leather producers create more cash-flow than they need for capital expendi-
tures. Contrary, electrical equipment producers finance 77% of capital expenditures with
external funds.
4.1 Determinants of FDI in the manufacturing sector
FDI in manufacturing is the stock of FDI in each of the DA-DN NACE classification
manufacturing industries. The stock of FDI in each manufacturing industry is called
FDIM. We regress FDIM and not FDIM per worker because of two reasons. First, we
want to have comparable results to those obtained in section 2. Secondly, we do not have
data on employment in firms that are foreign owned. Only data on total employment in
industries is available. Given that the employment strategy of domestic firms and foreign
8We aggregated the data proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to obtain values at the DA-DN level.
For the DN sector we take the mean of all other sectors. The dependence on external financing is: DA 0.14,
DN 0.4, DC -0.14, DD 0.28, DE 0.18, DF 0.33, DG 0.25, DH 0.23, DI 0.06, DJ 0.24, DK 0.45, DL 0.77,
DM 0.31, DN 0.27.
15
firms can differ significantly, dividing FDIM by workers might lead to a counterfactual
dynamic of the FDIM stock per worker. From now on, i denotes manufacturing industry,
j host country and t time. FDIM is regressed on its lagged value, because we expect
that the past value has a significant effect on the current stock. The presence of MNCs
in manufacturing as well as in any other sector of the economy is assumed to depend
strongly on the presence of foreign banks. Their impact on FDI stocks in the whole
economy is presented in section 2. To account for different needs for external finance,
we interact the foreign financial services stock with the dependence measure DEF. The
value added (VA) in an industry can be seen as the main reason why the MNC operates in
this industry. Further on, we investigate whether current investment in the same industry
has any effect on the presence of FDI. MNCs gain from their comparative advantage,
thus strong domestic investment should crowd out FDI. On the other hand, they need
intermediate goods in the production process and a branch of the literature argues that
they enforce domestic investment. The effect of domestic investment is thus assumed to
be ambiguous. One problem arises from the fact that we do not have any data on purely
domestic investment in the manufacturing sector. Total investment, denoted INV, is the
sum of foreign and domestic investment. FDIM is a stock and it is not easy to construct
the flow from the stock. Taking first differences might create a wrong time series, as the
depreciation of capital is neglected. However, applying this procedure shows that FDIM
flows account for around 30% of total investment. Thus, INV captures to a large part
domestic investment. Beside these economic variables, also the corporate tax rate and
risk measures are added. The risk measures are as before M2 money over reserves and
inflation. The current FDI stock in manufacturing is described by the following equation:
∆FDIMi jt = α∆FDIMi jt−1+β1∆FSFDI jt×DEFi+β2∆VAi jt +β3∆INVi jt
+β4∆TAX jt +β5∆INFLAT IONi jt +β6∆M2RESi jt +∆vi jt
(4.1)
The regression results are presented in table 4.1. In all specifications the Hansen test
of over-identification and the Arellano Bond test for autocorrelation of the error term of
second order performs well. The number of instruments used is less than the number
of groups. To keep the number of instruments low, we constrain the number of lags in
the GMM regression to at most 2. This constraint is applied to all GMM regressions in
this paper. Secondly, only FDIM_lag, VA and INV are treated as endogenous variables.
The other variables are treated as exogenous variables in the regression. A time trend is
included, however it is always insignificant.
The baseline specification (1) includes all variables mentioned above. First and
foremost, the lagged dependent variable, foreign financial services and value added enter
with high significance. These results are robust to different specifications which include
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other variables. The dependance of FDI on its lagged value in manufacturing industries
is similar to the case of all non-financial FDI studied in section 2. This indicates that
the persistence of FDI stock in the real economy is independent of the disaggregation
level. The current value depends approximately with a parameter α = 0.60 on its past
value. On average the long-run impact of the determinants presented above has to be
multiplied by 1/(1−α) = 2.5 to obtain its long-run impact. The long run multiplier for
each specification is presented in the last line of the results table. The increase of the
FSFDI stock multiplied by the corresponding dependence on external finance increases
the FDI stock in the same industry by a factor of around 0.11. The increase in value added
by one million international $ in an industry increases the FDIM stock by 0.41 million $.
Throughout all specifications, inflation does not affect the FDIM stock.
FDIM FDIM FDIM FDIM FDIM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FDIM_lag 0.5991 0.5628 0.6000 0.5961 0.5618
(6.82) (3.53) (6.88) (6.71) (4.07)
FSFDI x DEF 0.1081 0.1484 0.1069 0.1114 0.1530
(2.35) (2.05) (2.36) (2.38) (2.28)
VA 0.4128 0.5848 0.4107 0.4161 0.5917
(1.97) (1.71) (1.95) (1.97) (1.86)
INV -0.2611 -0.0993 -0.2642 -0.2577 -0.0864
(-0.89) (-0.32) (-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.27)
TAX 0.0369 0.2035 0.0908 0.4941 0.6608
(0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (0.23) (0.33)
INFLATION -3.1936 -2.7215 -3.0843 -3.2993 -3.0262
(-1.35) (-0.93) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.23)
M2RES -11.3211 -6.3529 -10.9315 -11.4530 -6.0771
(-0.96) (-0.55) (-0.99) (-0.93) (-0.51)
STKMKTCAP x DEF -0.0310 -0.0315
(-1.87) (-2.15)
ULCRA -0.0786 0.3354
(-0.11) (0.37)
H -18.5642 -43.1225
(-0.20) (-0.44)
N. Obs 703 703 703 703 703
N. Groups 84 84 84 84 84
Hansen test 71.6 73.24 70.63 74.55 75.44
p-value 0.189 0.156 0.212 0.132 0.117
AR(1) p-value 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.006
AR(2) p-value 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.063
N. Instruments 70 71 71 71 73
LR Multiplier 2.49 2.29 2.50 2.48 2.28
Table 4.1: Short-run determinants of FDI in the manufacturing sector. Two-step difference GMM
regression. (z-statistic) in brackets, bold = significant at 5% level. Time trend included, always
insignificant.
In specification (2) we include the capitalization of the stock-market interacted with the
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dependence on external finance. The stockmarket capitalization is a measure for the de-
velopment of the host country’s financial system and also a measure of general economic
development. The stock market allows domestic firms to acquire capital and also mea-
sures how developed they are. When domestic firms grow, also the stock market grows.
Because foreign firms gain from comparative advantage, this variable enters significantly
and negatively. The increase of the stock market capitalization by one million $, multi-
plied by the DEF, decreases the FDIM stock by 0.031 million. The other variables do
not change in a significant way. In specification (3) unit labor costs in relation to those
in Austria are included. This variable allows to account for the relative costs per unit of
produced good in each country in comparison to Western Europe. Because no other data
is available, Austria is considered as representative for the western EU. Relative unit labor
costs do not have any effect. Most likely, because the ULC seem to converge among coun-
tries and increase, as Akbar and McBride (2004) state. Specification (4) includes human
capital of the whole labor force. We assume that MNCs prefer to invest in human capital
rich countries. First, more advanced products can be created. Secondly, better educated
workers are potential clients for the advanced goods that MNCs produce. However, it has
no effect on FSFDI. All control variables are included in specification (5). The highly
significant variables do not change in an important way.
The empirical results allow to conclude that the lagged FDIM, FSFDI interacted
with dependence on external finance and the value added have a very strong and robust
effect. This result is consistent with the determinants of bilateral FDI stocks at total
economy level, studied in section 2.
4.2 The effect of FDI and FSFDI on domestic investment
As shown above, FSFDI has a strong positive effect on FDI and we investigate whether
it also has an effect on domestic investment. It is possible that foreign financial services
improve the business climate and enhance investment. Investment is considered as a
main source of economic growth. DeLong and Summers (1991) and Sala-i-Martin (1997)
show that investment, especially in manufacturing and equipment, is a robust and highly
significant factor of growth among many countries. This makes it an interesting question
to see whether the presence of MNCs has any effect on investment. For the countries
which we consider there could be a strong positive effect because a large share of FDI
is of horizontal nature and a lot of backward linkages exist (see Smarzynska Javorcik
(2004)). On the other hand the more advanced MNCs can invest in the more profitable
firms and thus crowd out domestic investment.
The long-run effect of foreign direct investment flows, loans and portfolio flows on
gross capital formation in 60 Developing Countries over the period 1979-1999 is studied
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by Mody and Murshid (2005). In their study none of the Transition Economies which we
consider is included. They find a very strong positive effect of FDI flows especially in
the 1980’s. Contrary, in the 1990’s there is no significant effect. The authors conclude
that the financial integration which appeared since the 1990’ allowed domestic investors
to diversify investment and invest also abroad.
Mileva (2008) applies their model to 22 Transition Economies over the period 1995-
2005. She finds a very strong effect of FDI on investment, especially if the domestic
financial market is underdeveloped. Mileva finds evidence for crowding-in of investment
in the least developed Transition Economies, namely the former Soviet Republics. MNCs
might buy input goods from local suppliers and motivate them to invest. However, for the
EU member Transition economies no positive effect on investment is found. She argues
that most likely the more productive MNCs push the less developed local competitors out
of the market.
Both studies mentioned before focus on investment on total economy level. We
apply the regression to investment in manufacturing industries. In this case investment is
very volatile and changes its direction depending on the current economic situation. The
results on the aggregate level and disaggregated level can be expected to be substantially
different. We include the lagged dependent variable, but expect it to be insignificant. We
do so because of two reasons. First, we want to have results that are comparable to the
recent literature. Secondly, the lagged domestic investment serves as a good instrument
for the endogenous variables. There is no data about strict domestic investment, thus we
calculate it. First, we take first differences of the FDIM stock to obtain flows (denoted
FDIMFL). This procedure neglects the depreciation of capital, thus contains an error.
The FDIM flow is subtracted from the total investment to obtain domestic investment.
Domestic investment is then divided by the number of workers in each industry (denoted
DOMINVW ). Total investment consists to around 70% of domestic investment. To make
sure that our results are not mainly affected by the way we calculate the variable, we
repeat the regression with total investment in the manufacturing industries. The results
do not change in a significant way. Neither Mody and Murshid (2005) nor Mileva (2008)
split FDI in its financial and non-financial part. We include FDIM and FSFDI flows
per worker in the regression, and expect that they have different effects. To analyze the
effect of foreign financial services and FDI on domestic investment, we regress domestic
investment per worker on the following variables:
∆DOMINVWi jt = α∆DOMINVWi jt−1+β1∆VAPWi jt +β2∆INFLAT IONit
+β3∆M2RES jt +β4∆INT SPREAD jt +β5∆ULCi jt +β6∆FDIMFLWi jt
+β7∆FMKTjt×DEFi+β8∆FSFDIFLWjt×DEFi+∆vi jt
(4.2)
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The dependent variable DOMINVW is domestic investment per worker and can be con-
sidered a good proxy for the capital intensity in each industry. It is reasonable to assume
that it depends on the value added. Thus, value added per worker VAPW is included.
This relation is not merely a correlation but a causality, as the correlation between these
variables is very low. This origins from the fact that we regress domestic investment and
not total investment on value added. Analysis of the time series shows that the relation-
ship is much more volatile than it is on macroeconomic level9. The willingness to invest
is affected by risk and the cost of capital, which is measured by INFLAT ION and inter-
est rate spread INT SPREAD. Macroeconomic risk is also measured by the ratio of M2
money to reserves. The dependent variable measures the capital intensity per worker in
each industry. Capital and labor can be considered as substitutes. Unit labor costs (ULC)
measure the cost of labor that is needed to produce one unit of output, relative to the
whole manufacturing sector. ULC for the whole manufacturing sector is normalized to
100. This tells whether the labor input is more effective or less effective in given indus-
tries than it is on average. In general the unit labor costs are increasing, which might
lead producers to substitute labor with capital. FDIMFLW denotes the flow of FDI in a
sector of manufacturing in the host country, which is divided by the number of workers.
The development of the financial market is measured as before and denoted FMKT . The
better the financial market, the easier domestic firms can operate. It facilitates the creation
of firms that produce intermediary goods, which gain from backward linkages. Further
on, the FSFDI flow should have an effect on domestic investment. Because the inflow of
FSFDI is used for investment purposes, a fraction should go to the manufacturing sec-
tor and increase domestic investment in it. The inflow of FSFDI per worker is denoted
FSFDIFLW . As above, the dependance on external finance DEF is used to account for
the impact of financial services and the financial market on different industries.
The specification is similar to that of Mody and Murshid (2005). But unlike in their
regression, we allow FDI and FSFDI flow to enter the regression with different coeffi-
cients. Moreover, we regress purely domestic investment. We consider this as an im-
provement because of two facts. FDI and FSFDI flow per worker can have an enhancing
effect on domestic investment, but their effect is expected to be different. Foreign banks
make investment and business simple and MNCs can be an important business partner and
a general source of technology and knowledge that might spill over to domestic firms. On
the other hand, FDI can crowd out domestic investment. Secondly, gross capital formation
9For the considered countries, investment at economy level accounts for around 25% of GDP annually,
ranging from 15% to 39%, with a variance of 5%. In the manufacturing industries it accounts for 20% of
value added on average, but it takes a very wide range, from -350% to 150% with variance 25%. This highly
volatility indicates that domestic investment is crowded out by FDIM. MNCs buy large and productive firms,
thus domestic investment sometimes becomes negative.
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is by construction the sum of domestic investment and FDI inflows. Thus total investment
and FDI inflow would be strongly correlated.
DOMINV DOMINV DOMINV
(1) (2) (3)
DOMINVW_lag -0.1098 -0.1117 -0.1115
(-1.04) (-1.01) (-1.06)
VAPW 0.1171 0.1098 0.1107
(2.26) (2.90) (2.38)
INFLATION -77.9181 -68.0933 -71.4540
(-1.10) (-0.94) (-1.00)
M2RES 625.4967 596.7087 625.6508
(1.17) (1.43) (1.16)
INTSPREAD -268.5894 -270.6855 -266.4457
(-1.46) (-1.53) (-1.50)
ULC 22.8838 21.7575 24.4710
(0.89) (0.94) (0.87)
FDIMFLW -1.1375 -1.1392 -1.1373
(-11.59) (-12.40) (-11.73)
FMKT x DEF -33.0496 -30.6883
(-0.40) (-0.36)
FSFDIFLW x DEF 0.0162 0.0162
(0.55) (0.59)
N. Obs 561 561 561
N. Groups 82 82 82
Hansen test 74.93 76.46 76.48
p-value 0.237 0.201 0.2
AR(1) p-value 0.277 0.278 0.278
AR(2) p-value 0.235 0.233 0.23
N. Instruments 76 76 77
Table 4.2: Short-run determinants of domestic investment per worker in the manufacturing sector.
Two-step difference GMM regression. (z-statistic) in brackets, bold = significant at 5% level.
The regression results are presented in table 4.2. In all specifications the regres-
sion can be considered as well specified. The number of instruments used is less than
the number of groups. In all specifications the value added per worker enters with high
significance. Neither inflation nor the interest rate spread enter significantly and also unit
labor costs can be neglected. The baseline specification (1) shows that the flow of FDI
has a very strong negative effect on domestic investment in manufacturing industries. The
estimated coefficient does not differ significantly from -1. This value is robust to any mod-
ification of the regression, thus it clearly shows that FDI crowds out domestic investment.
In the same industry MNCs invest in the most profitable firms and leave the second best
choice to the local competitors. One million $ invested by a MNCs replaces one million $
of domestic investment. Further on, growth of value added enforces domestic investment.
An increase of value added by one million $ leads to an increase of the investment flow
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by around 0.11 million. The development of the financial market alone does not play any
role. In specification (2) the flow of foreign financial services per worker is included. It
is interacted with the DEF variable. The inflow of foreign financial services has no ef-
fect on domestic investment. This seems to be quite surprising, as one could expect that
foreign banks facilitate access to credit and should enhance investment. In specification
(3) the inflow of financial services FDI and the development of the financial market are
included. The results do not differ from the previous ones. Again neither the develop-
ment of the financial market nor the inflow of foreign financial services has any effect.
It is quite troublesome to interpret this result. The literature presented at the beginning
of this section shows that foreign banks improve the financial system and facilitate host
firms access to credit. At the disaggregated level no effect is visible. As estimated in the
previous section, FSFDI enhances FDI. FDI picks the most productive investment objects
and crowds out domestic investment. Consequently less profitable objects remain for do-
mestic investors. Maybe this explains, why we cannot find any effect of foreign financial
services on domestic investment. The indirect effect annihilates the direct effect.
We conclude that value added attracts domestic investors, FSFDI inflow has no
effect and FDI inflow crowds out domestic investment.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the causes and effects of foreign direct investment in the financial
and non-financial sector in Transition Economies. The empirical results allow to make
three important statements. Non-financial FDI is positively affected by financial services
FDI. Foreign banks in the EU Transition Economies are mainly driven by non-financial
FDI and the capital intensity of a country. FDI inflow crowds out domestic investment in
the manufacturing sector.
We tackle three important questions using one set of countries in approximately
the same period of time. In the present literature those questions have been answered
only partially and always in relation to different countries and very different time periods.
Our study allows to draw a general conclusion. First and foremost, it is necessary to
study the nexus between FDI, FSDFI, domestic investment and economic growth. Studies
which look only at one direction of causality miss the mutual enforcement and the strong
interaction between those very important economic variables. Secondly, it is important to
apply a dynamic panel to capture the long-run relationship between the variables. GMM
has to be applied whenever possible to tackle the endogeneity problem and the issue of
hetersokedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term.
The main results of the estimations are as follows. First: At macroeconomic level,
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non-financial FDI stock that origins from different donor countries follows strongly its
past period realization. This is a sign that FDI constitutes a permanent capital stock and is
well integrated in the host economy. The current value is positively affected by the market
potential and also by foreign financial services which give financial stability. The risk of a
macroeconomic crisis has a strong detrimental effect. Secondly: The third section shows
that financial services FDI is strongly affected by non-financial FDI. This confirms the
follow-the-client hypothesis. However, domestic investment plays a significant role and
is an important determinant of FSFDI, too. Inflation affects the stock of FSFDI negatively.
Thirdly: In the last section we investigate the nexus in the manufacturing sector. Like at
aggregate level, the stock of FDI in each industry depends on its previous realization.
Moreover, foreign financial services and the value added have a strong positive effect.
Domestic investment has no effect on FDI. The stock market capital has a negative effect,
which might indicate that FDI prefer weak economies in which they can exploit their
comparative advantage. Further on, we find that domestic investment does not depend on
its past realization. It is a flow, and depends on the value added. FDI flows have a strong
negative effect and crowd out domestic investment.
Comparing our results with those from the recent literature we find that some results
change drastically, conditional on the period and the sector of the economy that is consid-
ered. For example, recent studies at aggregate level show that foreign banks increase and
stabilize the investment in the whole economy. However, in the manufacturing industries
we do not find any effect of FSFDI on domestic investment. This shows that a variable
can have different effects in different sectors of the economy and at different disaggrega-
tion levels. However, most of our results are in line with the empirical analysis presented
in the literature. Our results should be interpreted with caution. The results apply to a pe-
riod in which a high FDI inflow was observable. Nowadays, as the global financial crisis
makes multinational corporations consolidate their capital in the home country, the effect
might be very different. MNCs slow down their production or even stop it completely.
Foreign banks withdraw funds and shift them to their home country. The economic im-
pact of FDI might turn around. It was a major motor of economic growth, but due to the
strong connection of the economies to the global economy it might have a detrimental
effect during the next few years. This means, that a new study which uses data since the
middle of 2008 is necessary. Moreover, the effect of FDI and foreign financial services
on TFP and value added growth should be studied.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data description
Data sources and construction of time series. All variables expressed in $ are in interna-
tional $ at year 2000 constant prices. Data used in this paper is available upon request.
FDI, FSFDI - non-financial and financial services FDI stock in the host country. FDIM
- non-financial FDI in the manufacturing industries. Data reported as stocks. Source:
Vienna Institute for International Studies (2008a)
ULC - Unit Labor Costs, RULC - Relative Unit Labor Costs to Austria. Source OECD,
Vienna Institute for International Studies (2008b)
GDP - Gross Domestic Product, GDPC - GDP divided by population, GDPW - GDP
divided by labor force; INVW Gross Capital Formation, divided by labor force; DOM-
INVW - domestic investment, obtained by subtracting the FDI flow from total investment.
Source: The World Bank (2008).
INFLATION, INTSPREAD - spread between lending and deposit interest rate,
LENDINT - lending interest rate, REALINT - real interest rate, FIXEDLINE number
of fixed line and mobile phones per 1000 inhabitants, EDUCATED - share of labor force
with secondary and tertiary education, EXPORTS, M2RES - M2 money over domestic
reserves, GOVCONS - share of governmental consumption in GDP; Source: The World
Bank (2008).
FMKT - financial market development, stock market plus credit to private sector divided
by GDP; CDP - credit to private sector, divided by GDP; DCB - credit provided by banks,
divided by GDP; STKMT - stock market capitalization divided by GDP; STMKTCAP -
stock market capitalization; Source: The World Bank (2008).
RULC - relative unit labor costs. RULCi jt =ULC jt/ULCit
RGDP - relative GDP size. RGDPi jt = ln(GDP) jt− ln(GDP)it
RKL - relative capital endowments, proxied by realtive investment per worker. RKLi jt =
ln(INVW ) jt− ln(INVW )it
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i denotes the host country, j the donor country, t is the time index.
HUMANCAP - schooling human capital per worker. I calculate human capital of work-
ers with primary, secondary and tertiary education and then construct the average human
capital using the following formula. ht = shareprim ·hprimt + sharesec ·hsect + sharetert ·etertt
with hprimt = eφ(s_prim), hsect = e
φ(s_sec) and htertt = e
φ(s_tert). Here s denotes years of
schooling and φ(s) = 0.13 ∗ s for s ≤ 4, φ(s) = 0.13 ∗ 4+ 0.1 ∗ (s− 4) for 4 < s ≤ 8
and φ(s) = 0.13∗4+0.1∗4+0.07∗ (s−8) for 8 < s. Basing on empirical observations,
workers with primary education have 8 years of schooling, those with secondary 12 years
and those with tertiary 16 years, on average. Original source for shares of laborforce with
different education levels is The World Bank (2008).
HM - human capital in manufacturing industries. First, human capital is constructed as
above for the whole country. The human capital is multiplied by labor productivity in
each industry. The productivity for the whole manufacturing sector of each country is
normalized to 100 and origins from Vienna Institute for International Studies (2008a).
A.2 Stata commands used
Bilateral FDI, section 2
xtabond2 nonfsfdi l.nonfsfdi fsfdi mkpd rkl m2res intspread year,
iv(year mkpd ) gmm( l.nonfsfdi fsfdi rkl m2res intspread,
laglimit(. 2)) twostep robust noleve leq
FSFDI, section 3
xtivreg2 fsfdi l.fsfdi (nonfsfdi invtotal = l.nonfsfdi l.invtotal
l.gdp ulc exports ) freedom tax inflation m2res ,
fd small robust bw(4)
FDI in manufacturing, section 4.1
xtabond2 fdim l.fdim fsfdidef va inv tax inflation m2res
stockmktcapitaldef ulcra humancap year if country!="Latvia",
iv(year fsfdidef inflation m2res tax stockmktcapitaldef ulcra
humancap) gmm( ( l.fdim va inv ), lag(. 2) ) twostep robust noleveleq
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Domestic investment, section 4.2
xtabond2 dominvw l.dominvw vapw inflation intspread ulc m2res
fdimdifw financemktdef fsfdidifwdef year if country!="Latvia",
iv(year inflation intspread m2res financemktdef fsfdidifwdef )
gmm( ( l.dominvw vapw fdimdifw ulc), lag(. 2)) twostep robust noleveleq
A.3 Data statistics
Nr. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI 1082 868.4651 1920.127 -217.6137 15420.76
FDI_lag 980 790.5061 1780.338 -217.6137 15420.76
FSFDI 1274 2056.439 2789.485 28.92924 14578.72
MKPD 1274 25.05466 0.5005671 24.19063 26.22956
RKL 1207 1.31901 0.5744506 -0.3654585 3.260717
RGDP 1274 3.477498 1.622366 -0.5814743 7.498953
M2RES 1274 2.412449 0.6220888 1.256944 4.097924
INTSPREAD 1183 5.359921 2.144544 -1.372323 14.06833
FDI 980 132.9796 421.149 -2550.638 4103.592
FDI_lag 878 106.068 374.5442 -2550.638 4103.592
FSFDI 1157 367.2951 619.5027 -978.4277 3697.788
MKPD 1157 0.0438048 0.0128706 0.0161152 0.0736103
RKL 1090 -0.0601981 0.1076219 -0.7230849 0.3581786
RGDP 1157 -0.0270773 0.0306333 -0.1412716 0.1077309
M2RES 1157 0.0221332 0.3794107 -1.444741 0.7981882
INTSPREAD 1066 -0.4221164 1.318739 -4.718333 5.105803
Table A.1: Data statistics for section 2, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower part).
Nr. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FSFDI 98 2056.439 2802.726 28.92924 14578.72
FSFDI_lag 89 1845.112 2549.856 28.92924 12927.69
FDI 98 10584.29 13017.64 400.2242 62701.14
INV 95 10252.56 11544.8 1008.904 46904.21
FREEDOM 95 63.32316 6.702595 46.2 78
TAX 97 26.3299 7.10034 15 40.2
INFLATION 98 6.711214 6.444006 -0.922097 48.66133
M2RES 98 2.412449 0.6250418 1.256944 4.097925
REALINT 98 4.993422 4.686608 -14.51656 15.27376
FMKT 97 49.85987 22.0908 11.81805 103.2064
FSFDI 89 367.2951 622.7434 -978.4277 3697.788
FSFDI_lag 80 315.5996 590.4214 -978.4277 3697.788
FDI 89 1566.672 2801.056 -5406.441 15089.45
INV 86 533.4668 1430.186 -5702.375 5908.727
FREEDOM 86 1.023256 2.496052 -4 7.599998
TAX 88 -1.026136 2.227802 -11 4
INFLATION 89 -1.032768 4.502364 -28.16428 4.698236
M2RES 89 0.0221332 0.3813955 -1.444741 0.7981882
REALINT 89 -0.3313076 4.034395 -16.0329 15.39869
FMKT 88 3.104126 7.660714 -20.77226 25.65207
Table A.2: Data statistics for section 3, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower part).
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Nr. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDIM 873 429.1435 707.6299 -1.88382 4649.797
FDIM_lag 790 398.0549 657.9068 -1.88382 4636.717
FSFDI DEF 889 707.9924 1170.531 -948.9115 11225.61
VA 927 701.451 863.807 5.712266 6319.136
INV 924 187.0511 252.5842 -5.808561 1765.363
TAX 927 27.30313 7.82887 15 51.6
INFLATION 927 7.05333 7.80661 -0.922097 48.66133
M2RES 927 2.569574 0.6074822 1.423284 4.097925
STMKTCAP 927 1329.971 2382.008 -3147.637 26300.71
ULCRA 877 51.91482 44.85576 1.2 518.4
H 914 3.468907 0.1202323 3.301942 3.719676
FDIM 789 55.21046 175.032 -770.3252 1700.859
FDIM_lag 706 46.25041 162.5377 -770.3252 1700.859
FSFDI DEF 805 117.6945 250.1302 -753.3896 2847.297
VA 843 24.14048 131.1503 -1294.655 1672.601
INV 840 7.185123 78.93236 -378.9277 796.2479
TAX 843 -1.143298 2.604995 -13.3 4
INFLATION 843 -1.869979 5.345785 -28.16428 4.455523
M2RES 843 0.0040389 0.406079 -1.444741 0.7981882
STMKTCAP 843 179.3458 1134.063 -6050.847 11146.4
ULCRA 793 3.011475 10.00719 -59.2 81.4
H 830 0.0038473 0.0700235 -0.3028553 0.2864501
Table A.3: Data statistics for section 4.1, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower
part).
Nr. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DOMINVW 779 3176.465 6728.85 -51586.85 73030.45
DOMINVW_lag 701 3332.379 6418.381 -42216.75 73030.45
VAPW 914 15222.77 12844.36 2595.817 156272.6
INFLATION 927 7.05333 7.80661 -0.922097 48.66133
INTSPREAD 872 4.958184 1.666419 -1.372323 8.285833
ULC 907 118.456 52.05175 14.8 340.4
M2RES 927 2.569574 0.6074822 1.423284 4.097925
FDIMFLW 780 1353.902 5617.366 -21633.56 66761.94
FMKT DEF 927 12.21142 10.53213 -11.62392 63.93155
FSFDIDIFL DEF 793 3459.03 11121.07 -55635.53 117140.3
DOMINVW 696 -140.4853 8378.758 -91068.02 95530.14
DOMINVW_lag 618 272.0365 8356.659 -91068.02 95530.14
VAPW 831 741.8394 6186.371 -77981.97 107238.4
INFLATION 843 -1.869979 5.345785 -28.16428 4.455523
INTSPREAD 788 -0.3044262 1.274703 -4.131199 5.105803
ULC 825 0.0447272 13.46056 -79.7 104.8
M2RES 843 0.0040389 0.406079 -1.444741 0.7981882
FDIMFLW 697 327.7136 6498.306 -49749.09 85042.05
FMKT DEF 843 0.6420874 2.543675 -11.38638 16.22735
FSFDIDIFL DEF 710 227.0614 11796.28 -109778.5 78545.63
Table A.4: Data statistics for section 4.2, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower
part).
27
Nr. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln VAPW 914 9.431957 0.5928415 7.861657 11.95936
DOMINV 779 3176.465 6728.85 -51586.85 73030.45
FDIMFLW 780 1353.902 5617.366 -21633.56 66761.94
FSFDIW DEF 876 21299.77 60080.53 -141027.4 745573.4
TAX 927 27.30313 7.82887 15 51.6
INFLATION 927 7.05333 7.80661 -0.922097 48.66133
ln HM 894 5.778832 0.6569776 4.099947 8.133567
ln KW 912 10.04336 0.9226693 6.925606 13.02661
INTSPREAD 872 4.958184 1.666419 -1.372323 8.285833
DCB DEF 927 12.45392 10.08474 -10.4367 57.40184
CBTP DEF 927 10.08388 8.68767 -9.83686 54.10273
STKMKT DEF 927 2.127542 3.063307 -4.773468 26.25407
ln VAPW 831 0.0432378 0.1660653 -1.020861 1.159084
DOMINV 696 -140.4853 8378.758 -91068.02 95530.14
FDIMFLW 697 327.7136 6498.306 -49749.09 85042.05
FSFDIW DEF 793 3555.412 13062.96 -66222.63 151887.6
TAX 843 -1.143298 2.604995 -13.3 4
INFLATION 843 -1.869979 5.345785 -28.16428 4.455523
ln HM 812 0.0015293 0.1094903 -0.6275849 1.065452
ln KW 829 0.0709507 0.1075514 -0.7659502 0.9208164
INTSPREAD 788 -0.3044262 1.274703 -4.131199 5.105803
DCB DEF 843 0.4662231 1.719273 -7.725639 9.959278
CBTP DEF 843 0.5697253 1.872674 -10.56084 9.631168
STKMKT DEF 843 0.0723621 1.527565 -12.55328 12.92161
Table A.5: Data statistics for section ??, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower part).
A.4 Correlation matrices
FDI 1
FDI_lag 0.98 1
FSFDI 0.51 0.50 1
MKPD 0.46 0.44 0.77 1
RKL -0.10 -0.11 -0.17 -0.27 1
RGDP -0.27 -0.25 -0.51 -0.60 0.26 1
M2RES 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.41 -0.49 -0.23 1
INTSPREAD -0.19 -0.19 -0.27 -0.30 0.50 0.16 -0.39 1
FDI 1
FDI_lag 0.04 1
FSFDI 0.44 0.13 1
MKPD 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 1
RKL -0.01 0.10 0.03 -0.23 1
RGDP 0.08 0.10 0.15 -0.52 0.55 1
M2RES -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.12 -0.02 -0.08 1
INTSPREAD 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.18 -0.01 1
Table A.6: Correlation matrix for section 2, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower
part).
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FSFDI 1
FSFDI_lag 0.98 1
FDI 0.92 0.91 1
INV 0.87 0.83 0.85 1
FREDOM 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.13 1
TAX -0.11 -0.14 -0.18 0.06 -0.40 1
INFLATION -0.28 -0.31 -0.22 -0.08 -0.28 0.13 1
M2RES 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.18 -0.03 -0.07 1
REALINT 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.22 -0.44 0.40 -0.27 0.08 1
FMKT 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.17 0.28 -0.22 0.01 0.60 -0.32 1
FSFDI 1
FSFDI_lag 0.01 1
FDI 0.79 -0.14 1
INV 0.46 -0.27 0.52 1
FREDOM -0.22 -0.04 -0.19 -0.09 1
TAX -0.26 -0.04 -0.22 -0.18 0.16 1
INFLATION 0.01 -0.11 0.13 0.12 -0.23 -0.21 1
M2RES 0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 1
REALINT 0.03 0.09 -0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.23 -0.76 -0.01 1
FMKT 0.01 -0.17 -0.11 0.13 -0.13 0.10 0.15 0.23 -0.09 1
Table A.7: Correlation matrix for section 3, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower
part).
FDIM 1
FDIM_lag 0.97 1
FSFDI DEF 0.43 0.42 1
VA 0.76 0.74 0.57 1
INV 0.79 0.77 0.41 0.89 1
TAX -0.13 -0.14 -0.08 0.03 0.06 1
INFLATION -0.13 -0.15 -0.22 -0.04 0.00 0.17 1
M2RES 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.38 0.01 1
STMKTCAP 0.43 0.44 0.82 0.52 0.39 -0.13 -0.10 0.25 1
ULCRA -0.20 -0.20 -0.08 -0.19 -0.19 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 1
H -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.32 -0.30 0.13 -0.29 -0.06 -0.22 0.02 1
FDIM 1
FDIM_lag -0.05 1
FSFDI DEF 0.35 0.01 1
VA 0.26 0.08 0.16 1
INV 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.19 1
TAX -0.15 -0.04 -0.21 -0.11 0.05 1
INFLATION 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.21 1
M2RES -0.01 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.02 1
STMKTCAP 0.04 0.03 0.34 0.20 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 1
ULCRA -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 1
H 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.47 -0.15 0.11 0.01 0.04 1
Table A.8: Correlation matrix for section 4.1, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower
part).
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DOMINVW 1
DOMINVW_lag 0.21 1
VAPW 0.24 0.31 1
INFLATION 0.01 0.05 0.04 1
INTSPREAD -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 1
ULC -0.25 -0.30 -0.46 -0.05 -0.05 1
M2RES 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.23 -0.07 1
FDIMFLW -0.57 0.08 0.43 0.05 -0.06 -0.19 -0.09 1
FMKT DEF 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.05 -0.23 -0.15 0.27 0.02 1
FSFDIDIFL DEF 0.20 0.27 0.35 -0.07 -0.05 -0.30 0.04 0.15 0.14 1
DOMINVW 1
DOMINVW_lag -0.45 1
VAPW 0.00 -0.11 1
INFLATION -0.06 0.02 0.11 1
INTSPREAD -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.04 1
ULC 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.09 1
M2RES 0.14 -0.12 0.02 -0.15 0.01 -0.02 1
FDIMFLW -0.82 0.27 0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 1
FMKT DEF 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.13 -0.05 1
FSFDIDIFL DEF -0.02 0.10 0.26 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.03 1
Table A.9: Correlation matrix for section 4.2, in levels (upper part) and in first differences (lower
part).
References
Akbar, Y. and J. McBride (2004). Multinational enterprise strategy, foreign direct in-
vestment and economic development: the case of the hungarian banking industry.
Journal of World Business 39, 89–105.
Alfaro, L., A. Chanda, S. Kalemli-Ozcan and S. Sayek (2004). FDI and economic
growth: the role of local financial markets. Journal of International Economics 64,
89–112.
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies.
Baum, C. (2006). An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. Stata Press.
Bevan, A. and S. Estrin (2004). The determinants of foreign direct investment into
european transition economies. Journal of Comparative Economics 32, 775–787.
Borensztein, E., J. De Gregorio and J. W. Lee (1998). How does FDI affect Economic
Growth? Journal of International Economics 45, 115–135.
Buch, C. (1997). Opening up for foreign banks: How Central and Eastern Europe can
benefit. Economics of Transition 5(2), 339–366.
Buch, C. M. (2000). Why Do Banks Go Abroad? - Evidence from German Data.
Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 9(1), 33–67.
Carstensen, K. and F. Toubal (2004). Foreign direct investment in Central and East-
ern European countries: a dynamic panel analysis. Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics 32, 3–22.
DeLong, B. J. and L. H. Summers (1991). Equipment investment and economic
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 445–502.
Eller, M., P. Haiss and K. Steiner (2006). Foreign direct investment in the financial
sector and economic growth in central and eastern europe: The crucial role of the
efficiency channel. Emerging Markets Review 7, 300–319.
Eurostat (2009). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/. Eurostat.
Goldberg, L. G. and D. Johnson (1990). The Determinants of US Banking Activity
Abroad. Journal of International Money and Finance 9, 123–137.
Guiso, L., T. Jappelli, M. Padula and M. Pagano (2004). Financial market integration
and economic growth in the EU. Economic Policy 40, 523–577.
Heritage Foundation (2009). 2009 Index of Economic Freedom. Washington D. C.
Jeanneau, S. and M. Micu (2002). Determinants of international bank lending to
emerging market countries. BIS Working Papers No 112.
Mérö, K. and M. Valentinyi (2003). The Role of Foreign Banks in Five Central and
Eastern European Countries. Hungarian Central Bank Working Paper 10.
Mileva, E. (2008). The Impact of Capital Flows on Domestic Investment in Transition
Economies. European Central Bank, Working Paper 871.
Mody, A. and A. P. Murshid (2005). Growing up with capital flows. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 65, 249–266.
Neuhaus, M. (2006). The Impact of FDI on Economic Growth: An Analysis for the
Transition Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.
OECD (2009). http://www.oecd.org/statsportal. Organisation for Economic Develop-
ment and Cooperation (OECD).
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1998). Financial Dependence and Growth. American
Economic Review 80(3), 559–586.
Roodman, D. (2006). How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to "Difference" and "Sys-
tem" GMM in Stata. Center for Global Development, Washington, Working Paper
103.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). I just ran two million regressions. American Economic Re-
view, Papers and Proceedings 87, 183–197.
31
Schaffer, M. E. (2007). xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM
and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models. .
Smarzynska Javorcik, B. (2004). Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Produc-
tivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. The
American Economic Review 94(3), 605–627.
The World Bank (2008). World Development Indicators. Washington: The World Bank
Group.
Vienna Institute for International Studies (2008a). wiiw Database on Foreign Direct
Investment in Central, East and Southeast Europe. Vienna.
Vienna Institute for International Studies (2008b). wiiw Industrial Database Eastern
Europe. Vienna.
Weill, L. (2003). Banking efficiency in transition economies: The role of foreign own-
ership. The Economics of Transition 11(3), 569–592.
Wezel, T. (2004). Foreign Bank Entry Into Emerging Economies: An Empirical As-
sessment of the Determinants and Risks Predicated on German FDI Data. Deutsche
Bundesbank Discussion Series 01.
32
